This file is a mirror of EUSKAL HERRIA JOURNAL by Basque Red Net.

THE ZEN PLAN AND THE ANTI-TERRORISM PACTS

The plan Zona Especial Norte (ZEN, Special Northern Zone), as stated in its chapter on objectives, is a political plan coordinated by the police and political institutions to intervene ideologically in the Basque Country. ZEN was created in 1983 by the former Socialist government led by prime minister Felipe Gonzalez and implemented by the ministry of Interior Jose Barrionuevo.. It seeked a greater struggle against Basque dissidents by the physical destruction of ETA activists and supporters.

During the 1980s paramilitary death squads known as "Antiterrorist Liberation Groups" (GAL) conducted a campaign of bombings, kidnappings, and extrajudicial killings against suspected Basque activists in Northern Basque Country under French administration.

GAL killed at least 28 suspected Basque activists during the 1980s. No less than one third of the victims were targeted by mistake. More than 14 senior government officials, police and a Civil Guard general have been formally charged for their involvement with the GAL death squads. The corpses of the first victims of GAL, Jose Ignacio Zabala and Jose Antonio Lasa, were found in March 1995. They showed signs of extensive beatings and torture, including loss of teeth, finger and toe nails. They were killed by blows to the skull followed by shots in the back of the head. Their bodies were buried in quicklime.

In September 1996 the Spanish newspaper El Mundo published allegations that government agents acting during the government of Gonzalez had kidnapped vagrants for use as guines pigs to test drugs for use by security forces to kidnap suspected Basque activists in southern France and smuggle them back to Spain. It quoted the documents as saying the drug had been provided by a top cardiologist who was a close friend of General Emilio Alonso Manglano, who headed the Spanish military intelligence agency CESID for 14 years until June 1985. The alleged experiments in 1988, in which one beggar died, were nicknamed "Operation Mengele" after the Nazi death-camp doctor Josef Mengele. A judicial investigation onto the allegations is still under way.

The Spanish dirty war in Northern Basque Country resulted in a greater cooperation between France and Spain to end the "Basque problem" by police action. But Spain's lack of legitimation in Spain's Southern Basque Country---the Spanish constitution of 1978 was approved by only one-third of the electorate--and Basques' despisement of security forces, required the cooperation of Spain's Basque allies in power.

The goal of the Spanish government was now to transform the conflict between Spain and the Basque Country into a conflict between Basques and for that it needed the cooperation of the two regional governments in the Basque region.

Many Basques went along with the game and were instrumental in the alienation of Basque dissidents, of a very important sector of Basque society, and the problem now is not just one of the Basque Country against France and Spain. The problem now is among Basques too which is why it's so important that a political solution be reached soon since Spain, with the full cooperation of France and and other allies, will do everything possible to turn the Basque conflict into a civil war between Basques.

In 1988 two "anti-terrorism pacts" were agreed by Spanish and Basque parties (with the exception of the left-wing coalition Herri Batasuna) in the two Basque territories with limited regional autonomy: the Pact of Ajuria Enea, in Bascongadas, the Basque Autonomous Community; and the Navarrese Anti-Terrorist Pact, in Navarra's Foral Community. These pacts were not about political agreements but about the product of a long gestation and precedents which clearly demonstrated their nature and goal: to transform the conflict into a civil confrontation between Basques required the fragmentation of the Basque nationalist community


The Road to the Pacts

The Seminario sobre Violencia, Politica y Terrorismo (a conference on violence, politics and terrorism), organized by the Spanish media group Grupo 16, took place in Madrid in 1984. Government officials, members of political parties, journalists and media people participated in the conference. The conference culminated with the Declaración de Madrid sobre terrorismo (Madrid Declaration on Terrorism), ratified in 1986 by members of the Spanish and Basque political parties, including Jose Maria Benegas, Joseba Elosegi, Jaime Mayor Oreja and Mario Onaindia. Jose Barrionuevo--indicted in 1986 on charges of masterminding the GAL death squads--presented the declaration.

In 1985, prior to the Madrid declaration, and while the government death squads where in full campaign in Northern Basque Country, the Basque armed organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque Homeland and Freedom) killed Spain's army colonel and chief of the regional police of Bascongadas, Carlos Diaz Arcocha. The moderate Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) declared the killing of Diaz Arcocha a direct attack on the PNV. Shortly after the killing of Diaz Arcocha, the PNV proposed popular mobilizations and the political parties' unity against ETA; a media ad hoc policy; a plan to promote "citizenship consciousness"; and a commission of international experts to study the violence in the Basque Country and reccomend ways to end it. The project was approved by the Bascongadas parliament.

The Commission of Experts made a report which was made public on April 1986. Members of the commission included Clive Rose, Peter Janke, Hans Joseph Horchem, Franco Ferracutti and Jacques Leaute. Clive Rose was Britain's ambassador to NATO, Peter Janke was the head of the British Institute for the studies of conflicts, an institution linked to the military and specialized in the "anti-terrorism" fight in Northern Ireland. Hans Joseph Horchem had taken part in a congress of the German right-wing party, Conservative Action, during which the freedom of Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess had been demanded. The experts' point of view on the Basque conflict included:

The political nature of Basque terrorism requires the cooperation of Basques to fight it.

More power to the regional police of Bascongadas to fight terrorism and greater cooperation among the information services of the central and regional governments;

A "separate legislation for Basque prisoners convicted on terrorism;" the social re-integration of the political prisoners "to obtain the cooperation of the terrorists and re-integrate them into the main current of political life";

An anti-terrorism plan that would get the support of the population: weapons used against terrorism must be identified as civil--without emphasizing the military aspects;

The teaching of Basque culture--necessary to fight violence according to the Commission--must be taught within the European context;

More implication of the regional institutions in the conflict;

Negotiation is not excluded but it is not specified as a means to achieve a political solution to the conflict.

The Anti-terrorism Pacts

The Madrid Pact against terrorism was agreed on November 1987 by Spanish political parties and the regional parties, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE).

The fifth article of the Madrid Pact states the importance of an agreement among the Basque regional parties in Bascongadas "for the achievement of peace in Euskadi and the rest of the state. Therefore, we value the initiative of the lehendakari [the president of the regional government of three Basque provinces, Araba, Bizkaia and Navarre, known as Bascongadas; and PNV leader, Jose Antonio Ardanza) of the Basque government." The PNV's proposal for actions against ETA was presented by Ardanza and approved by the regional parliament in 1985.

The Pact for the Normalization and Pacification of Euskadi (also known as the Pact of Ajuria Enea or Anti-terrorism Pact), was agreed by the political parties of Bascongadas---with the exception of Herri Batasuna---in January 1988, two months after the Anti-terrorist Pact of Madrid was established. The Navarrese Anti-terrorism Pact was agreed by the political parties of Navarre in October 1988.

The two pacts adopted the recommendations made by the Commission of Experts: the institutional legitimation of the Spanish state; and the repression and delegitimation of the Basque resistance.

Articles four and five of the Pact of Ajuria Enea state the following:

Regarding police action:

"We share [understanding of] the need for and importance of police action that contributes to the eradication of terrorism, the protection of the principles mentioned and the prevention of armed actions and the persecution of their authors" (Article 4)

Regarding international cooperation:

"We express our just conviction that international cooperation between the governments and the different judicial powers is indispensable for the eradication of violence." (Article 5)

The offer made by the Spanish government to former police officer Jose Amedo in 1988. The government offered to relocate Amedo to a Spanish embassy after two GAL mercenaries had identified him as a GAL key figure at the operational level. [Jose Amedo and another police officer were sentenced in 1991 to a total of 108 years in prison for ordering or carrying out murders and kidnappings of suspected ETA activists.

The assignment of Andres Cassinello as General Captain of the Spanish army in Bascongadas in May 1988, five months after the Pact of Ajuria Enea was signed. At the First Ibero-American Congress of Military Sociology in 1985, Andres Cassinello said: "I prefer terrorism to the KAS alternative [ETA's negotiating demands prior to April 1995], and war to the independence of Euskadi".

Bibliography: Iñaki Goioaga, Los entresijos del Pacto de Ajuria Enea (Egin, 2/27/95); Francisco Letamendia, Historia del Nacionalismo Vasco y de ETA (R&B Ediciones); Towards the Liberation of Euskadi (Ekin, 1992).